A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. Acknowledgments
xi
Questions
1(12)
Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective
1(5)
Questions
6(3)
Overview: The architecture of the book
9(4)
Tools I
13(94)
Overview: Mental representation and phenomenal states
13(2)
From mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing, intentional content, and conscious experience
15(28)
Introspectability as attentional availability
32(6)
Availability for cognitive processing
38(1)
Availability for the control of action
39(4)
From mental to phenomenal simulation: The generation of virtual experiential worlds through dreaming, imagination, and planning
43(19)
From mental to phenomenal presentation: Qualia
62(32)
What is a quale?
66(3)
Why qualia don't exist
69(14)
An argument for the elimination of the canonical concept of a quale
83(3)
Presentational content
86(8)
Phenomenal presentation
94(13)
The principle of presentationality
96(2)
The principle of reality generation
98(2)
The principle of nonintrinsicality and context sensitivity
100(4)
The principle of object formation
104(3)
The Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience
107(106)
What is the conceptual prototype of a phenomenal representatum?
107(9)
Multilevel constraints: What makes a neural representation a phenomenal representation?
116(92)
Global availability
117(9)
Activation within a window of presence
126(5)
Integration into a coherent global state
131(12)
Convolved holism
143(8)
Dynamicity
151(5)
Perspectivalness
156(7)
Transparency
163(16)
Offline activation
179(5)
Representation of intensities
184(5)
``Ultrasmoothness'': The homogeneity of simple content
189(9)
Adaptivity
198(10)
Phenomenal mental models
208(5)
Neurophenomenological Case Studies I
213(52)
Reality testing: The concept of a phenomenal model of reality
213(2)
Deviant phenomenal models of reality
215(49)
Agnosia
215(7)
Neglect
222(6)
Blindsight
228(9)
Hallucinations
237(14)
Dreams
251(13)
The concept of a centered phenomenal model of reality
264(1)
Tools II
265(34)
Overview: Mental self-representation and phenomenal self-consciousness
265(1)
From mental to phenomenal self-representation: Mereological intentionality
265(14)
From mental to phenomenal self-simulation: Self-similarity, autobiographical memory, and the design of future selves
279(6)
From mental to phenomenal self-presentation: Embodiment and immediacy
285(14)
The Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person Perspective
299(130)
What is a phenomenal self-model?
299(6)
Multilevel constraints for self-consciousness: What turns a neural system-model into a phenomenal self?
305(48)
Global availability of system-related information
305(5)
Situatedness and virtual self-presence
310(3)
Being-in-a-world: Full immersion
313(7)
Convolved holism of the phenomenal self
320(4)
Dynamics of the phenomenal self
324(6)
Transparency: From system-model to phenomenal self
330(10)
Virtual phenomenal selves
340(4)
Adaptivity: The self-model as a tool and as a weapon
344(9)
Descriptive levels of the human self-model
353(26)
Neural correlates
353(8)
Cognitive correlates
361(1)
Social correlates
362(17)
Levels of content within the human self-model
379(32)
Spatial and nonspatial content
380(6)
Transparent and opaque content
386(4)
The attentional subject
390(5)
The cognitive subject
395(10)
Agency
405(6)
Perspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation
411(16)
Global availability of transient subject-object relations
420(1)
Phenomenal presence of a knowing self
421(1)
Phenomenal presence of an agent
422(5)
The self-model theory of subjectivity
427(2)
Neurophenomenological Case Studies II
429(118)
Impossible egos
429(1)
Deviant phenomenal models of the self
429(116)
Anosognosia
429(8)
Ich-Storungen: Identity disorders and disintegrating self-models
437(24)
Hallucinated selves: Phantom limbs, out-of-body-experiences, and hallucinated agency
461(61)
Multiple selves: Dissociative identity disorder
522(7)
Lucid dreams
529(16)
The concept of a phenomenal first-person perspective
545(2)
Preliminary Answers
547(88)
The neurophenomenological caveman, the little red arrow, and the total flight simulator: From full immersion to emptiness
547(11)
Preliminary answers
558(67)
Being no one
625(10)
References
635(28)
Name Index
663(8)
Subject Index
671
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