Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. List of contributors vii Preface ix Chapter 1. Editor's introduction and overview 1(8) Alvin E. Roth Chapter 2. Disagreement in bargaining: Models with incomplete information 9(18) Kalyan Chatterjee Chapter 3. Reputations in games and markets 27(36) Robert Wilson Chapter 4. An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining 63(10) Robert W. Rosenthal Chapter 5. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information 73(26) Drew Fudenberg David Levine Jean Tirole Chapter 6. Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information 99(16) Ariel Rubinstein Chapter 7. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information 115(34) Roger B. Myerson Chapter 8. Sequential bargaining mechanisms 149(32) Peter C. Cramton Chapter 9. The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model 181(34) Martin J. Osborne Chapter 10. Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions 215(18) Stef Tijs Hans Peters Chapter 11. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: A survey of recent results 233(26) William Thomson Chapter 12. Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining 259(10) Alvin E. Roth Chapter 13. Bargaining and coalitions 269(36) K.G. Binmore Chapter 14. Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining 305(16) Sergiu Hart Chapter 15. A comment on the Coase theorem 321(20) William Samuelson Chapter 16. Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: Who should bear the burden of proof? 341(22) Joel Sobel Chapter 17. The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives 363 Vincent P. Crawford