This critical introduction to the philosophy of language focusses on one or two texts which have had a seminal influence on work in the subject, and uses these as a way of approaching both the central topics and the various traditions of dealing with them. Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1(4) Locke and the nature of language 5(16) Introduction 5(1) What Locke says 5(4) Meaning and signification 9(1) Problems about communication 10(4) Words and sentences 14(4) Locke's less disputed assumptions 18(3) Frege on Sense and reference 21(28) Introduction 21(1) Psychologism and the Context Principle 22(4) Frege and logic 26(2) Frege's mature system (i): reference 28(4) Frege's mature system (ii): Sense 32(4) Two further uses of the notion of Sense 36(4) Questions about Sense 40(7) Sense and the Basic Worry 47(2) Russell on definite descriptions 49(25) Introduction 49(1) The problems 50(3) Russell's solution in outline 53(2) Russell's solution in detail 55(6) Strawson on definite descriptions 61(2) Donnellan on referential and attributive uses of descriptions 63(3) Russellian defences 66(4) Russell beyond descriptions 70(4) Kripke on proper names 74(20) Introduction 74(2) Kripke's target 76(2) Kripke's objections (i): simple considerations 78(2) Kripke's objections (ii): epistemic and modal considerations 80(5) Defences of the description theory 85(5) Sense and direct reference 90(2) Conclusion 92(2) Natural-kind terms 94(19) Introduction 94(2) A Lockean view of natural-kind terms: the individualist version 96(6) A Lockean view without individualism 102(3) How can there be Kripke--Putnam natural-kind terms? 105(3) How can natural-kind terms be rigid designators? 108(5) Quine on de re and de dicto modality 113(21) Introduction 113(1) Quine's three grades of modal involvement 114(4) Referential opacity and Leibniz's law 118(3) Referential opacity and the three grades 121(5) Quine's logical problem with de re modality 126(4) Quine's metaphysical worries about de re modality 130(4) Reference and propositional attitudes 134(18) Introduction 134(1) Quine's problem 135(3) Quine's proposed solution 138(7) Perry and the essential indexical 145(2) The problems for Quine's solution 147(3) Consequences 150(2) The semantics of propositional attitudes 152(21) Introduction 152(1) Kripke, names, necessity and propositional attitudes 153(2) Kripke's Pierre 155(3) Referential solutions to the puzzle 158(5) A Fregean response 163(3) Davidson's proposal 166(3) Can Davidson's proposal solve Kripke's puzzle? 169(4) Davidson on truth and meaning 173(21) Introduction 173(2) Meanings as entities 175(4) Tarski's `definition' of truth 179(4) Davidson's use of Tarski 183(4) The obvious objections to Davidson's proposal 187(2) Truth and the possibility of general semantics 189(2) One final worry 191(3) Quine and Davidson on translation and interpretation 194(20) Introduction 194(1) Quine and radical translation 195(3) Davidson and radical interpretation 198(4) Statements of meaning and propositional attitudes 202(3) Theories of meaning and speakers' knowledge 205(5) How fundamental is radical interpretation? 210(4) Quine on the indeterminacy of translation 214(17) Introduction 214(1) `Two dogmas of empiricism' 215(4) Indeterminacy and inscrutability 219(9) Resisting Quine on indeterminacy: some simple ways 228(3) Austin on speech acts 231(17) Introduction 231(1) Performative utterances 232(2) Towards a general theory of speech acts 234(5) Truth and performatives 239(3) Issues for a theory of speech acts 242(6) Grice on meaning 248(23) Introduction 248(1) Grice's overall strategy 249(4) Sympathetic objections to Grice's account of speaker-meaning 253(5) Sympathetic objections to Grice's account of expression-meaning 258(3) An unsympathetic objection to Grice's account of expression-meaning 261(3) An unsympathetic objection to Grice's account of speaker-meaning 264(4) After Grice 268(3) Kripke on the rule-following paradox 271(21) Introduction 271(1) The sceptical challenge 272(5) The `sceptical solution' 277(6) A community-based response 283(1) Can dispositionalism be defended? 284(3) Anti-reductionism and radical interpretation 287(5) Wittgenstein on the Augustinian picture 292(20) Introduction 292(1) The Augustinian picture 293(2) The Anti-Metaphysical interpretation 295(4) The Quasi-Kantian interpretation 299(9) Worries about these Wittgensteinian views 308(4) Glossary 312(4) Works cited 316(7) Index 323